We introduce KL-hardness, a new notion of hardness for search problems which on the one hand is satisfied by all one-way functions and on the other hand implies both next-block pseudoentropy and inaccessible-entropy, two forms of computational entropy used in recent constructions of pseudorandom generators and statistically hiding commitment schemes, respectively. Thus, KL-hardness unifies the latter two notions of computational entropy and sheds light on the apparent "duality" between them. Additionally, it yields a more modular and illuminating proof that one-way functions imply next-block inaccessible entropy, similar in structure to the proof that one-way functions imply next-block pseudoentropy (Vadhan and Zheng, STOC '12).
Introduction 1.One-way functions and computational entropy
One-way functions [DH76] are on one hand the minimal assumption for complexity-based cryptography [IL89] , but on the other hand can be used to construct a remarkable array of cryptographic primitives, including such powerful objects as CCA-secure symmetric encryption, zero-knowledge proofs and statistical zero-knowledge arguments for all of NP, and secure multiparty computation with an honest majority [GGM86, GMW91, GMW87, HILL99, Rom90, Nao91, HNO + 09]. All of these constructions begin by converting the "raw hardness" of a one-way function (OWF) to one of the following more structured cryptographic primitives: a pseudorandom generator (PRG) [BM82, Yao82] , a universal one-way hash function (UOWHF) [NY89] , or a statistically hiding commitment scheme (SHC) [BCC88] .
The original constructions of these three primitives from arbitrary one-way functions [HILL99, Rom90, HNO + 09] were all very complicated and inefficient. Over the past decade, there has been a series of simplifications and efficiency improvements to these constructions [HRVW09, HRV13, HHR + 10, VZ12], leading to a situation where the constructions of two of these primitives -PRGs and SHCs -share a very similar structure and seem "dual" to each other. Specifically, these constructions proceed as follows:
1. Show that every OWF f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n has a gap between its "real entropy" and an appropriate form of "computational entropy". Specifically, for constructing PRGs, it is shown that the function G(x) = (f (x), x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) has "next-block pseudoentropy" at least n + ω(log n) while its real entropy is H (G(U n )) = n [VZ12] where H (·) denotes Shannon entropy. For constructing SHCs, it is shown that the function G(x) = (f (x) 1 , . . . , f (x) n , x) has "next-block accessible entropy" at most n − ω(log n) while its real entropy is again H (G(U n )) = n [HRVW09] . Note that the differences between the two cases are whether we break x or f (x) into individual bits (which matters because the "next-block" notions of computational entropy depend on the block structure) and whether the form of computational entropy is larger or smaller than the real entropy.
This common construction template came about through a back-and-forth exchange of ideas between the two lines of work. Indeed, the uses of computational entropy notions, flattening, and hashing originate with PRGs [HILL99] , whereas the ideas of using next-block notions, obtaining them from breaking (f (x), x) into short blocks, and entropy equalization originate with SHCs [HRVW09] . All this leads to a feeling that the two constructions, and their underlying computational entropy notions, are "dual" to each other and should be connected at a formal level.
In this paper, we make progress on this project of unifying the notions of computational entropy, by introducing a new computational entropy notion that yields both next-block pseudoentropy and next-block accessible entropy in a clean and modular fashion. It is inspired by the proof of [VZ12] that (f (x), x 1 , . . . , x n ) has next-block pseudoentropy n + ω(log n), which we will describe now.
Next-block pseudoentropy via KL-hardness
We recall the definition of next-block pseudoentropy, and the result of [VZ12] relating it to one-wayness.
Definition 1.1 (next-block pseudoentropy, informal). Let n be a security parameter, and X = (X 1 , . . . , X m ) be a random variable distributed on strings of length poly(n). We say that X has next-block pseudoentropy at least k if there is a random variable Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z m ), jointly distributed with X, such that:
1. For all i = 1, . . . , m, (X 1 , . . . , X i−1 , X i ) is computationally indistinguishable from (X 1 , . . . , X i−1 , Z i ).
2.
m i=1 H (Z i |X 1 , . . . , X i−1 ) ≥ k. Equivalently, for I uniformly distributed in [m], X I has conditional pseudoentropy at least k/m given (X 1 , . . . , X i−1 ).
It was conjectured in [HRV10] that next-block pseudoentropy could be obtained from any OWF by breaking its input into bits, and this conjecture was proven in [VZ12]:
Theorem 1.2 ([VZ12], informal). Let f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a one-way function, let X be uniformly distributed in {0, 1} n , and let X = (X 1 , . . . , X m ) be a partition of X into blocks of length O(log n). Then (f (X), X 1 , . . . , X m ) has next-block pseudoentropy at least n + ω(log n).
The intuition behind Theorem 1.2 is that since X is hard to sample given f (X), then it should have some extra computational entropy given f (X). This intuition is formalized using the following notion of being "hard to sample": Definition 1.3 (KL-hard for Sampling). Let n be a security parameter, and (X, Y ) be a pair of random variables, jointly distributed over strings of length poly(n). We say that X is ∆-KL-hard for sampling given Y if for all probabilistic polynomial-time S, we have
where KL (· ·) denotes Kullback-Leibler divergence (a.k.a. relative entropy). 1 That is, it is hard for any efficient adversary S to sample the conditional distribution of X given Y , even approximately.
The first step of the proof of Theorem 1.2 is to show that one-wayness implies KLhardness of sampling (which can be done with a one-line calculation):
Lemma 1.4. Let f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a one-way function and let X be uniformly distributed in {0, 1} n . Then X is ω(log n)-KL-hard to sample given f (X).
Next, we break X into short blocks, and show that the KL-hardness is preserved: Lemma 1.5. Let n be a security parameter, let (X, Y ) be random variables distributed on strings of length poly(n), let X = (X 1 , . . . , X m ) be a partition of X into blocks, and let I be uniformly distributed in [m] . If X is ∆-KL-hard to sample given Y , then X I is (∆/m)-KL-hard to sample given (Y, X 1 , . . . , X I−1 ).
Finally, the main part of the proof is to show that, once we have short blocks, KLhardness of sampling is equivalent to a gap between conditional pseudoentropy and real conditional entropy.
Lemma 1.6. Let n be a security parameter, Y be a random variable distributed on strings of length poly(n), and X a random variable distributed on strings of length O(log n). Then X is ∆-KL-hard to sample given Y iff X has conditional pseudoentropy at least H (X|Y )+∆ given Y .
Putting these three lemmas together, we see that when f is a one-way function, and we break X into blocks of length O(log n) to obtain (f (X), X 1 , . . . , X m ), on average, the conditional pseudoentropy of X I given (f (X), X 1 , . . . , X I−1 ) is larger than its real conditional entropy by ω(log n)/m. This tells us that the next-block pseudoentropy of (f (X), X 1 , . . . , X m ) is larger than its real entropy by ω(log n), as claimed in Theorem 1.2.
We remark that Lemma 1.6 explains why we need to break the input of the one-way function into short blocks: it is false when X is long. Indeed, if f is a one-way function, then we have already seen that X is ω(log n)-KL-hard to sample given f (X) (Lemma 1.4), but it does not have conditional pseudoentropy noticeably larger than H (X|f (X)) given f (X) (as correct preimages can be efficiently distinguished from incorrect ones using f ).
Inaccessible entropy
As mentioned above, for constructing SHCs from one-way functions, the notion of next-block pseudoentropy is replaced with next-block accessible entropy: Definition 1.7 (next-block inaccessible entropy, informal). Let n be a security parameter, and Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y m ) be a random variable distributed on strings of length poly(n). We say that Y has next-block accessible entropy at most k if the following holds.
Let G be any probabilistic poly(n)-time algorithm that takes a sequence of uniformly random strings R = ( R 1 , . . . , R m ) and outputs a sequence Y = ( Y 1 , . . . , Y m ) in an "online fashion" by which we mean that Y i = G( R 1 , . . . , R i ) depends on only the first i random strings of G for i = 1, . . . , m. Suppose further that Supp( Y ) ⊆ Supp(Y ).
Then we require:
(Next-block) accessible entropy differs from (next-block) pseudoentropy in two ways:
1. Accessible entropy is useful as an upper bound on computational entropy, and is interesting when it is smaller than the real entropy H (Y ). We refer to the gap H (Y ) − k as the inaccessible entropy of Y .
2. The accessible entropy adversary G is trying to generate the random variables Y i conditioned on the history rather than recognize them. Note that we take the "history" to not only be the previous blocks ( Y 1 , . . . , Y i−1 ), but the coin tosses ( R 1 , . . . , R i−1 ) used to generate those blocks.
Note that one unsatisfactory aspect of the definition is that when the random variable Y is not flat (i.e. uniform on its support), then there can be an adversary G achieving accessible entropy even larger than H (Y ), for example by making Y uniform on Supp(Y ). Similarly to (and predating) Theorem 1.2, it is known that one-wayness implies nextblock inaccessible entropy.
Theorem 1.8 ( [HRVW09] ). Let f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a one-way function, let X be uniformly distributed in {0, 1} n , and let (Y 1 , . . . , Y m ) be a partition of Y = f (X) into blocks of length O(log n). Then (Y 1 , . . . , Y m , X) has next-block accessible entropy at most n − ω(log n).
Unfortunately, however, the existing proof of Theorem 1.8 is not modular like that of Theorem 1.2. In particular, it does not isolate the step of relating one-wayness to entropy-theoretic measures (like Lemma 1.4 does) or the significance of having short blocks (like Lemma 1.6 does).
Our results
We remedy the above state of affairs by providing a new, more general notion of KLhardness that allows us to obtain next-block inaccessible entropy in a modular way while also encompassing what is needed for next-block pseudoentropy.
Like in KL-hardness for sampling, we will consider a pair of jointly distributed random variables (Y, X). Following the spirit of accessible entropy, the adversary G for our new notion will try to generate Y together with X, rather than taking Y as input. That is, G will take randomness R and output a pair ( Y , X) = G( R) = ( G 1 ( R), G 2 ( R)), which we require to be always within the support of (Y, X). Note that G need not be an online generator; it can generate both Y and X using the same randomness R. Of course, if (Y, X) is efficiently samplable (as it would be in most cryptographic applications), G could generate ( Y , X) identically distributed to (Y, X) by just using the "honest" sampler G for (Y, X). So, in addition, we require that the adversary G also come with a simulator S, that can simulate its coin tosses given only Y . The goal of the adversary is to minimize the KL divergence KL R, Y S(Y ), Y for a uniformly random R. This divergence measures both how well G 1 approximates the distribution of Y as well as how well S simulates the corresponding coin tosses of G 1 . Note that when G is the honest sampler G, the task of S is exactly to sample from the conditional distribution of R given G( R) = Y . However, the adversary may reduce the divergence by instead designing the sampler G and simulator S to work in concert, potentially trading off how well G( R) approximates Y in exchange for easier simulation by S. Explicitly, the definition is as follows.
Definition 1.9 (KL-hard, informal version of Definition 3.2). Let n be a security parameter, and (Y, X) be a pair of random variables jointly distributed over strings of length poly(n).
We say that (Y, X) is ∆-KL-hard if the following holds.
Similarly to Lemma 1.4, we can show that one-way functions achieve this notion of KL hardness.
Lemma 1.10. Let f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a one-way function and let X be uniformly distributed in {0, 1} n . Then (f (X), X) is ω(log n)-KL-hard.
Note that this lemma implies Lemma 1.4. If we take G to be the "honest" sampler G(x) = (f (x), x), then we have:
which is is ω(log n) by Lemma 1.10. That is, KL-hardness for sampling preimages (as in Definition 1.3 and Lemma 1.4) is obtained by fixing G and focusing on the hardness for the simulator S, i.e. the divergence KL Y Y .
Conversely, we show that inaccessible entropy comes by removing the simulator S from the definition, and focusing on the hardness for the generator G. It turns out that this removal is possible when we break Y into short blocks, yielding the following definition.
Definition 1.11 (next-block-KL-hard, informal). Let n be a security parameter, and Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y m ) be a random variable distributed on strings of length poly(n). We say that Y is ∆-next-block-KL-hard if the following holds.
Let G be any probabilistic poly(n)-time algorithm that takes a sequence of uniformly random strings R = ( R 1 , . . . , R m ) and outputs a sequence Y = ( Y 1 , . . . , Y m ) in an "online fashion" by which we mean that
We require that for all such G, we have:
where we use the notation z <i = (z 1 , . . . , z i−1 ) and R = (R 1 , . . . , R m ) is a dummy random variable independent of Y .
That is, the goal of the online generator G is to generate Y i given the history of coin tosses R <i with the same conditional distribution as Y i given Y <i . Notice that there is no explicit simulator in the definition of next-block-KL-hardness. Nevertheless we can obtain it from KL-hardness by using sufficiently short blocks: Lemma 1.12. Let n be a security parameter, let (Y, X) be random variables distributed on strings of length poly(n),
An intuition for the proof is that since the blocks are of logarithmic length, given Y i we can simulate the corresponding coin tosses of R i of G by rejection sampling and succeed with high probability in poly(n) tries.
A nice feature of the definition of next-block-KL-hardness compared to inaccessible entropy is that it is meaningful even for non-flat random variables, as KL divergence is always nonnegative. Moreover, for flat random variables, it equals the inaccessible entropy:
Intuitively, this lemma comes from the identity that if Y is a flat random variable and
We stress that we do not require the individual blocks Y i have flat distributions, only that the random variable Y as a whole is flat. For example, if f is a function and X is uniform, then (f (X), X) is flat even though f (X) itself may be far from flat.
Putting together Lemmas 1.10, 1.12, and 1.13, we obtain a new, more modular proof of Theorem 1.8. The reduction implicit in the combination of these lemmas is the same as the one in [HRVW09] , but the analysis is different. (In particular, [HRVW09] makes no use of KL divergence.) Like the existing proof of Theorem 1.2, this proof separates the move from one-wayness to a form of KL-hardness, the role of short blocks, and the move from KL-hardness to computational entropy. Moreover, this further illumination of and toolkit for notions of computational entropy may open the door to other applications in cryptography.
We remark that another interesting direction for future work is to find a construction of universal one-way hash functions (UOWHFs) from one-way functions that follows a similar template to the above constructions of PRGs and SHCs. There is now a construction of UOWHFs based on a variant of inaccessible entropy [HHR + 10], but it remains more complex and inefficient than those of PRGs and SHCs.
Preliminaries
Notations. For a tuple x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), we write x ≤i for (x 1 , . . . , x i ), and x <i for (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 ).
poly denotes the set of polynomial functions and negl the set of all negligible functions: ε ∈ negl if for all p ∈ poly and large enough n ∈ N, ε(n) ≤ 1/p(n). We will sometimes abuse notations and write poly(n) to mean p(n) for some p ∈ poly and similarly for negl(n).
ppt stands for probabilistic polynomial time and can be either in the uniform or non-uniform model of computation. All our results are stated as uniform polynomial time oracle reductions and are thus meaningful in both models.
For a random variable X over X , Supp(X) def = {x ∈ X : Pr[X = x] > 0} denotes the support of X. A random variable is flat if it is uniform over its support. Random variables will be written with uppercase letters and the associated lowercase letter represents a generic element from its support.
Information theory.
Definition 2.1 (Entropy). For a random variable X and x ∈ Supp(X), the sample entropy
Definition 2.2 (Conditional entropy). Let (A, X) be a pair of random variables and
) and the conditional entropy of A given X is the expected conditional sample entropy: Proposition 2.7 (Data-processing inequality). Let (X, Y ) be a pair of random variables and let f be a function defined on Supp(Y ), then:
Definition 2.8 (Max-KL-divergence). Let (X, Y ) be a pair of random variables and δ ∈ [0, 1]. We define KL δ max (X Y ) to be the quantile of level δ of KL * x (X Y ), equivalently it is the smallest ∆ ∈ R satisfying:
and it is characterized by the following equivalence:
Block generators Definition 2.9 (Block generator). An m-block generator is a function G :
denotes the i-th block of G on input r and |G i | = i denotes the bit length of the i-th block.
Definition 2.10 (Online generator). An online m-block generator is a function G :
only depends on r ≤i . We sometimes write G i (r ≤i ) when the input blocks i + 1, . . . , m are unspecified.
Definition 2.11 (Support). The support of a generator G is the support of the random variable Supp G(R) for uniform input R. If G is an (m + 1)-block generator, and Π is a binary relation, we say that G is supported on
When G is an (m + 1)-block generator supported on a binary relation Π, we will often use the notation G w def = G m+1 to emphasize that the last block corresponds to a witness for the first m blocks.
Cryptography.
Definition 2.12 (One-way Function). Let n be a security parameter, t = t(n) and ε = ε(n).
If f is (n c , 1/n c )-one-way for every c ∈ N, we say that f is (strongly) one-way.
Search Problems and KL-hardness
In this section, we first present the classical notion of hard-on-average search problems and introduce the new notion of KL-hardness. We then relate the two notions by proving that average-case hardness implies KL-hardness.
Search problems
For a binary relation Π ⊆ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * , we write Π(y, w) for the predicate that is true iff (y, w) ∈ Π and say that w is a witness for the instance y 2 . To each relation Π, we naturally associate (1) a search problem: given y, find w such that Π(y, w) or state that no such w exist and (2) the decision problem defined by the language L Π def = {y ∈ {0, 1} * : ∃w ∈ {0, 1} * , Π(y, w)}. FNP denotes the set of all relations Π computable by a polynomial time algorithm and such that there exists a polynomial p such that Π(y, w) ⇒ |w| ≤ p(|y|). Whenever Π ∈ FNP, the associated decision problem L Π is in NP. We now define average-case hardness.
≤ ε for all time t randomized algorithm A, where the probability is over the distribution of Y and the randomness of A.
Example. For f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , the problem of inverting f is the search problem
Remark. Consider a distributional search problem (Π, Y ). Without loss of generality, there exists a (possibly inefficient) two-block generator G = (G 1 , G w ) supported on Π such that G 1 (R) = Y for uniform input R. If G w is polynomial-time computable, it is easy to see that the search problem Π G 1 , G 1 (R) is at least as hard as (Π, Y ). The advantage of writing the problem in this "functional" form is that the distribution (G 1 (R), R) over (instance, witness) pairs is flat, which is a necessary condition to relate hardness to inaccessible entropy (see Theorem 4.6).
Furthermore, if G 1 is also polynomial-time computable and (Π, Y ) is (poly(n), negl(n))hard, then R → G 1 (R) is a one-way function. Combined with the previous example, we see that the existence of one-way functions is equivalent to the existence of (poly(n), negl(n))hard search problems for which (instance, witness) pairs can be efficiently sampled.
KL-hardness
Instead of considering an adversary directly attempting to solve a search problem (Π, Y ), the adversary in the definition of KL-hardness comprises a pair of algorithm ( G, S) where G is a two-block generator outputting valid (instance, witness) pairs for Π and S is a simulator for G: given an instance y, the goal of S is to output randomness r for G such that G 1 (r) = y. Formally, the definition is as follows.
Definition 3.2 (KL-hard). Let (Π, Y ) be a distributional search problem. We say that (Π, Y ) is (t, ∆)-KL-hard if:
for all pairs ( G, S) of time t algorithms where G is a two-block generator supported on Π and R is uniform randomness for G 1 . Similarly, (Π, Y ) is (t, ∆)-KL δ max -hard if for all such pairs:
Note that a pair ( G, S) achieves a KL-divergence of zero in Definition 3.2 if G 1 (R) has the same distribution as Y and if G 1 S(y) = y for all y ∈ Supp(Y ). In this case, writing
When the KL-divergences in Definition 3.2 are upper-bounded, we can lower bound the probability of the search problem being solved (Lemma 3.4) This immediately implies that hard search problems are also KL-hard.
Remark. As we see, a "good" simulator S for a generator G is one for which G 1 S(Y ) = Y holds often. It will be useful in Section 4 to consider simulators S which are allowed to fail by outputting a failure string r / ∈ Supp( R), (e.g. r = ⊥) and adopt the convention that G 1 (r) = ⊥ whenever r / ∈ Supp( R). With this convention, we can without loss of generality add the requirement that 
Proof. We have:
Now, the first claim follows by Jensen's inequality (since x → 2 −x is convex) and the second claim follows by Markov' inequality when considering the event that the sample-KL is smaller than ∆ (which occurs with probability at least δ by assumption).
Relation to KL-hardness for sampling. In [VZ12] , the authors introduced the notion of KL-hardness for sampling: for jointly distributed variables (Y, W ), W is hard for sampling given Y if it is hard for a polynomial time adversary to approximate-measured in KL-divergence-the conditional distribution W given Y . Formally:
Definition 3.5 (KL-hard for sampling, Def. 3.4 in [VZ12] ). Let (Y, W ) be a pair of random variables, we say that W is (t, ∆)-KL-hard to sample given Y if for all time t randomized algorithm S, we have:
As discussed in Section 1.2, it was shown in [VZ12] that if f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is a one-way function, then f (X), X 1 , . . . , X n ) has next-bit pseudoentropy for uniform X ∈ {0, 1} n (see Theorem 1.2). The first step in proving this result was to prove that X is KL-hard to sample given f (X) (see Lemma 1.4).
We observe that when (Y, W ) is of the form (f (X), X) for some function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and variable X over {0, 1} n , then KL-hardness for sampling is implied by KLhardness by simply fixing G to be the "honest sampler" G(X) = (f (X), X). Indeed, in this case we have:
We can thus recover Lemma 1.4 as a direct corollary of Theorem 3.3. x ∈ {0, 1} n } and Y def = f (X) for X uniform over {0, 1} n . If f is (t, ε)-one-way, then (Π f , Y ) is t , log(1/ε) -KL-hard and X is t , log(1/ε) -KL-hard to sample given Y with t = Ω(t).
Witness KL-hardness. We also introduce a relaxed notion of KL-hardness called witness-KL-hardness. In this notion, we further require ( G, S) to approximate the joint distribution of (instance, witness) pairs rather than only instances. For example, the problem of inverting a functionf over a random input X is naturally associated with the distribution f (X), X . The relaxation in this case is analogous to the notion of distributional one-way function for which the adversary is required to approximate the uniform distribution over preimages.
Definition 3.7 (Witness KL-hardness). Let Π be a binary relation and (Y, W ) be a pair of random variables supported on Π. We say that (Π, Y, W ) is (t, ∆)-witness-KL-hard if for all pairs of time t algorithms ( G, S) where G is a two-block generator supported on Π, for uniform R:
if for all such pairs:
We introduced KL-hardness first, since it is the notion which is most directly obtained from the hardness of distribution search problems. Observe that by the data processing inequality for KL divergence (Proposition 2.7), dropping the third variable on both sides of the KL divergences in Definition 3.7 only decreases the divergences. Hence, KL-hardness implies witness-KL-hardness as stated in (Theorem 3.8). As we will see in Section 4 witness-KL-hardness is the "correct" notion to obtain inaccessible entropy from: it is in fact equal to inaccessible entropy up to 1/ poly losses. Remark. The data processing inequality does not hold exactly for KL max , hence the KL max statement in Theorem 3.8 does not follow with the claimed parameters in a black-box manner from Theorem 3.3. However, an essentially identical proof given in Appendix A yields the result.
Inaccessible Entropy and Witness KL-hardness
In this section, we relate our notion of witness KL-hardness to the inaccessible entropy definition of [HRVW16] . Roughly speaking, we "split" the KL-hard definition into blocks to obtain an intermediate blockwise KL-hardness property (Section 4.1) that we then relate to inaccessible entropy (Section 4.2). Together, these results show that if f is a one-way function, the generator G f (X) = f (X) 1 , . . . , f (X) n , X has superlogarithmic inaccessible entropy.
Next-block KL-hardness and rejection sampling
Consider a binary relation Π and a pair of random variables (Y, W ) supported on Π. For an online (m + 1)-block generator G supported on Π, it is natural to consider the simulator Sim G T that exploits the block structure of G:
The subscript T is the maximum number of attempts after which Sim G T gives up and outputs ⊥. The formal definition of Sim G T is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Rejection sampling simulator Sim G T Input: y 1 , . . . , y m ∈ ({0, 1} * ) m Output:
As will be established in Theorem 4.3, the "approximation error" of the pair ( G,
, Y, W , decomposes as the sum of two terms:
1. The first term measures how well G ≤m approximates the distribution Y in an online manner.
2. The second term measures the success probability of the rejection sampling procedure.
The second term can be made arbitrarily small by setting the number of trials T in Sim G T to be a large enough multiple of m · 2 where is the length of the blocks of G ≤m (Lemma 4.4) . This leads to a poly(m) time algorithm whenever is logarithmic in m. That is, given an online block generator G for which G ≤m has short blocks, we obtain a corresponding simulator "for free". This leads to the following clean definition of next-block hardness that makes no reference to simulators.
where R i is a "dummy" random variable over the domain of G i and independent of Y ≤m+1 . Similarly, for δ ∈ [0, 1], we say that (Y 1 , . . . , Y m+1 ) is (t, ∆)-block-KL δ max -hard if for every G as above:
where ( Y ≤m+1 , R ≤m+1 ) are defined as above.
Remark. Since Y <i is a function of R <i , the first conditional distribution in the KL is effectively Y i | R <i . Similarly the second distribution is effectively Y i |Y <i . The extra random variables are there for syntactic consistency.
We are now ready to present the main result of this section -witness-KL-hardness implies next-block KL-hardness -which is established by decomposing:
as outlined above.
Theorem 4.2. Let Π be a binary relation and let (Y, W ) be a pair of random variables supported on Π. Let Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y m ) where the bit length of Y i is at most . Then we have:
max -hard where t = Ω(tδ ∆ /(m 2 2 )).
Proof. We apply the following lemma with (Y ≤m , Y m+1 ) def = (Y, W ). The theorem follows since when the oracle G is replaced by an algorithm with running time t , without loss of generality the maximum length of an input random block is v ≤ t and the running time of the simulator becomes O(mT t ) for T = m · 2 /(∆ ln 2) in the witness-KL-hard case and T = m · 2 /(δ ∆ ln 2) in the witness-KL max -hard case. 
Similarly, if
Pr
then for all δ ∈ (0, δ]:
Moreover, the running time of Sim G T is O(mvT ) with at most mT oracle calls to G, where v is the longest length of a random input r i .
. We focus on sample notions first and consider r ∈ Supp( R) and y def = G(r). Then by the Chain Rule (Proposition 2.6),
The penultimate equality is by definition of rejection sampling:
where the last equality is because when r ∈ Supp( R), R <i = r <i ⇒ Y <i = y <i and because Y i is independent of R <i given Y <i (as R <i is simply a randomized function of Y <i ). Combining the previous two derivations we obtain:
Now, the first claim of the lemma follows by taking expectations on both sides and directly applying the following lemma: 
The second claim of the lemma follows after first establishing using Lemma 4.4 and Markov's inequality that:
Proof of Lemma 4.4. By definition of Sim G T , we have:
Applying Jensen's inequality, we have:
where p y = Pr G i (r <i , R i ) = y . Since the function x/ 1 − (1 − x) T is convex (see Lemma A.1 in the appendix), the maximum of the expression inside the logarithm over probability distributions {p y } is achieved at the extremal points of the standard probability simplex. Namely, when all but one p y → 0 and the other one is 1.
Remark. For fixed distribution and generators, in the limit where T grows to infinity, the error term caused by the failure of rejection sampling in time T vanishes. In this case, KL-hardness implies block-KL-hardness without any loss in the hardness parameters.
Blockwise hardness and inaccessible entropy
We first recall the definition from [HRVW16] , slightly adapted to our notations.
Definition 4.5 (Inaccessible Entropy). Let (Y 1 , . . . , Y m+1 ) be a joint distribution. 4 We say that (Y 1 , . . . , Y m+1 ) has t-inaccessible entropy ∆ if for all (m + 1)-block online generators G running in time t and consistent with (Y 1 , . . . , Y m+1 ):
where ( Y 1 , . . . , Y m+1 ) = G( R 1 , . . . , R m+1 ) for a uniform R ≤m+1 . We say that (Y 1 , . . . , Y m+1 ) has (t, δ)-max-inaccessible entropy ∆ if for all (m + 1)-block online generators G running in time t and consistent with (Y 1 , . . . , Y m+1 ):
Unfortunately, one unsatisfactory aspect of Definition 4.5 is that inaccessible entropy can be negative since the generator G could have more entropy than (Y 1 , . . . , Y m+1 ): if all the Y i are independent biased random bits, then a generator G outputting unbiased random bits will have negative inaccessible entropy. On the other hand, next-block KL-hardness (Definition 4.1) does not suffer from this drawback.
Moreover, in the specific case where (Y 1 , . . . , Y m+1 ) is a flat distribution 5 , then no distribution with the same support can have higher entropy and in this case Definitions 4.1 and 4.5 coincide as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.6. Let (Y 1 , , . . . , Y m+1 ) be a flat distribution and G be an (m + 1)-block generator consistent with Y ≤m+1 . Then for Y ≤m+1 = G( R ≤m+1 ) for uniform R ≤m+1 :
1. For every y ≤m+1 , r ≤m+1 ∈ Supp( Y ≤m+1 , R ≤m+1 ), it holds that
In particular, (Y 1 , . . . , Y m+1 ) is (t, ∆)-block-KL δ max -hard if and only if it has (t, δ)max-inaccessible entropy at least ∆.
Furthermore
so in particular, (Y 1 , . . . , Y m+1 ) is (t, ∆)-block-KL-hard if and only if it has tinaccessible entropy at least ∆.
Proof. For the sample notions, the chain rule (Proposition 2.6) gives:
for all y since Y is flat. Hence:
so the second claim follows by taking the expectation over ( Y ≤m+1 , R ≤m+1 ) on both sides.
By chaining the reductions between the different notions of hardness considered in this work (witness-KL-hardness, block-KL-hardness and inaccessible entropy), we obtain a more modular proof of the theorem of Haitner et al. [HRVW16] , obtaining inaccessible entropy from any one-way function.
Theorem 4.7. Let n be a security parameter, f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a (t, ε)-oneway function, and X be uniform over {0, 1} n . For ∈ {1, . . . , n}, decompose f (X) def = (Y 1 , . . . , Y n/ ) into blocks of length . Then:
1. For every 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ log(1/ε), (Y 1 , . . . , Y n/ , X) has t -inaccessible entropy at least (log(1/ε) − ∆) for t = Ω t · ∆ · 2 /(n 2 · 2 ) .
2. For every 0 < δ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ log(1/ε) − log(2/δ), (Y 1 , . . . , Y n/ , X) has (t , δ)-max-inaccessible entropy at least (log(1/ε) − log(2/δ) − ∆) for t = Ω t · δ · ∆ · 2 /(n 2 · 2 ) .
Proof. Since f is (t, ε)-one-way, the distributional search problem Π f , f (X) where Π f = {(f (x), x) : x ∈ {0, 1} n } is (t, ε)-hard. Clearly, (f (X), X) is supported on Π f , so by applying Theorem 3.8, we have that (Π f , f (X), X) is (Ω(t), log(1/ε))-witness-KLhard and (Ω(t), log(1/ε) − log(2/δ))-witness-KL δ/2 max -hard. Thus, by Theorem 4.2 we have that (Y 1 , . . . , Y n/ , X) is Ω t · ∆ · 2 /(n 2 · 2 ) , log(1/ε) − ∆ -block-KL-hard and Ω t · δ · ∆ · 2 /(n 2 · 2 ) , log(1/ε) − log(2/δ) − ∆ -block-KL δ max -hard, and we conclude by Theorem 4.6. algorithm A Gw,S (y) def = G w (S(y)). Then Pr Π Y, A Gw,S (Y ) = Pr Π(Y, G w (S(Y )))
The witness-KL-hardness then follows by applying Jensen's inequality (since 2 −x is convex) and the witness-KL max -hardness follows by Markov's inequality by considering the event that the sample-KL is smaller than ∆ (this event has density at least δ).
